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Sympathy and Community in Walt Whitman’s  Song of Myself 
Abstract 
Whitman’s professed sympathy for a diverse range of individuals in Song of Myself has been the 
subject of much criticism. Some readers see his ambition to speak to and ‘for’ all others as an 
imperialist prescription of homogeneity between humans, an arrogation of agency and erasure of 
difference. I ask if there a way of mobilizing sympathy in this poem which does not rely on the 
assumption of a common humanity. Briefly situating Whitman in relation to the nineteenth century 
discourse of sentimentalism, I go on to explore how sympathy can be heard as a shareable material 
affect which exceeds the moral and humanist register. With particular reference to Whitman’s use of 
‘catalogues’ I look at how Song of Myself creates a ‘community of those who have nothing in 
common’. 
 
Renowned for its maximal inclusivity and celebration of the “common people”, Whitman’s 
Song of Myself is a poem of immense optimism about the social power of sympathy. The democratic 
and compassionate persona who declares “I am he attesting sympathy” (sec.22) aspires to speak to, 
and for, the many different individuals of the American en masse and will not countenance “a single 
person slighted or left away” (sec.19). Indeed, in a remarkable catalogue of America’s diversity, 
section fifteen of the poem moves from contralto to carpenter, duck shooter to deacon, culminating 
in Whitman’s affirmation: “And such as it is to be of these more or less I am,/ And of these one and 
all I weave the song of myself’ (sec. 15). Perhaps no other poet has aspired to contain such 
“multitudes” or to embrace a geography of selfhood that is so expansively drawn. 
In light of the global rise of nationalisms and increasing hostility to cultural difference, it is 
timely to ask if Whitman’s concerns with inclusivity and sympathy remain relevant to our thinking 
about community today. To be sympathetic to the experiences of others may seem a 
fundamental prerequisite for dwelling harmoniously within a community. However, when individuals 
occupy vastly different planes of reality, is it plausible to appeal to the sharing of affects or to 
holding feelings “in common”? Beginning with a reflection on Whitman’s recourse to the rhetoric of 
sympathy in his pre-Leaves of Grass writing, I look at how the desire to see oneself ‘in the place’ of 
the other is both a key element in his reflections on community and the source of an essential 
dilemma: Is Whitman’s ambition to speak to and ‘for’ all others in Song of Myself an imperialist 
prescription of homogeneity between humans, an erasure of structural inequities and suppression of 
the agency of the other? Given the paradox that sympathetic identification with the other functions 
as both a force of social cohesion and as a means of effacing material inequality, I ask whether there 
is a way of reading sympathy in Song of Myself which does not rely on the assumption of a common 
identity. Building on the recent work of Jane Bennett, I show that the modern notion of sympathy as 
‘felt sentiment’ is only one aspect of the sympathetic impetus of Whitman’s poetry and that 
Whitman draws from a competing vitalist tradition in which sympathy is viewed as an external force 
of nature. In seeking to find a way to mobilize this idea in relation to community, I return to 
Whitman’s catalogues of America’s diversity to explore whether in this intriguing form a new way of 
thinking about sympathy and community might be found. 
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1. Sympathy and Sentimentalism 
 
As Alphonso Lingis has noted: “Community is usually conceived as constituted by a number of 
individuals having something in common – a common language, a common conceptual framework – 
and building something in common: a nation, a polis, an institution” (Lingis 1994: ix). In nineteenth 
century ante-bellum America, the discourse of sympathy functioned as the common currency of 
debate in the politically benevolent movements of the day. In a typical gesture, the abolitionist 
Elizabeth Margaret Chandler implores her readers to sympathise with the plight of the slave: if they 
would “imagine themselves for a few moments in his very circumstances, .. enter into his feelings, 
comprehend all his wretchedness, [and] transform themselves mentally into his very self, they would 
not long withhold their compassion” (qtd. in De Jong 2013: 1). Through the act of emotional 
identification with another, it is hoped that individuals would foster political and spiritual 
communities of common sentiment. The classic appeal to this effort of imagination is to be found in 
Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), which as Mary G. De Jong notes, had been 
reprinted three times in northern American cities by 1822 (Ibid). Smith argues that by “changing 
places in fancy with the sufferer” we come to be affected by what the sufferer feels: “By the 
imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the torments, we 
enter as it were into his body and become in some measure the same person with him” (Smith 
[1759] 2010: 8). By cultivating potent “fellow feeling” with the sufferer we go beyond mere pity and 
begin to “feel” the plight of the one condemned.  
In some striking moments in Song of Myself Whitman takes this imaginative feat to its 
maximum. In the very long catalogue that makes up section 33 of Song of Myself, Whitman’s “I” 
announces: “I am the hounded slave, I wince at the bite of the dogs”. Evoking the horror of pursuit 
and capture, the sympathising persona asserts: “I do not ask the wounded person how he feels, I 
myself become the wounded person”. This extreme identification with the suffering other is an 
enduring refrain throughout Whitman’s work. Involved in the anti-capital punishment movement 
primarily as a journalist in 1840s, and from 1846 onwards as editor of Brooklyn Daily Eagle, Whitman 
published numerous pieces of his own writing advocating the abolition of hanging. Paul Christian 
Jones notes that the dominant tenor in these writings is emotional rather than rational: “he often 
asks his readers to feel for the criminals he is writing about, to identify sympathetically with them, 
and to imagine themselves in the place of these criminals” (Jones 2009: 4). In one such piece he asks 
his readers to imagine the dire condition of the malefactor in his prison cell and to remember that 
he is still “a duplicate of the humanity that stays in us all” (qtd. in Bennett 2015:610). Through he 
may be “seared in vice”, the sinner shares a core human identity with the virtuous. As members of 
society we hold our fundamental “humanity” in common.  
However, as Whitman notes in another pre-Leaves of Grass publication, this appeal to what we 
hold in common may also serve to divide us. Strong identification with the corporate identity of the 
state may inhibit individuals from conceiving of themselves as a criminal or imagining themselves in 
a wrongdoer’s place. In "A Dialogue," an 1845 piece published in the Democratic Review, Whitman 
appears to question the way in which the concept of “community” serves the morality of the mob. 
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Casting his dialogue as a debate between an individual and society, Whitman points to the irony of a 
state sanctioning acts of retribution which, if committed by the individual, it would it would 
condemn as immoral: 
When the criminal claims that the very act of demanding his death (as "revenge" for the harm he 
has caused society) is as much of a crime as his own deed was, society differentiates between his 
acts and those of the State: "'The case is different,' rejoins society. 'We are a community--you 
are but a single individual'." (qtd in Jones, 2009: 9)  
Of course, the concept of a common identity can be deployed as readily in the service of 
discriminatory politics of exclusion as it can within an egalitarian register, as sub-national forms of 
identification have graphically demonstrated in the violent conflicts of both Whitman’s day and our 
own. Here it is salutary to conclude that Whitman’s appeal to what we hold “in common” is 
pragmatic rather than principled. In these political debates, Whitman is quick to invoke a Christian 
rhetoric of sympathy when it serves the end of clemency for the transgressor. For this reason, when 
Whitman aligns himself with “those antagonists of capital punishment who argued that sympathy 
was a necessary quality of being a Christian” (Jones 2009: 8), this may say more about Whitman’s 
investment in a politics of sympathy than it does about his commitment to the values of the 
Christian church.  
A similar point might be made about Whitman’s recourse to sentimentalism to “write” 
communities into being. As Stefan Schöberlein has noted, the sentimental genre “creates feelings of 
community, moral righteousness, and belonging through affective storytelling, often deemed 
emotionally excessive” (Schöberlein 2018: 453).  By drawing on a repertoire of stock familial figures, 
rhetorical devices and the arousal of pathos through various conventional scenarios, sentimental 
literature unites a readership around a common cause for compassion. Whitman’s tale of the 
“runaway slave” with “sweated body” and “bruised feet” in section ten of Song of Myself would be a 
paradigmatic example.i However, Schöberlein argues that in focusing on the morally right action and 
response, the sentimental tends to negate elements of structural violence such as racism, gender 
inequality and poverty, highlighting in its stead the human story of one person’s pain. Since 
sympathetic identification which is so affectively freighted evokes pity for the wretched of the earth 
it has an uneasy tendency to “commodify suffering, especially of socially marginal figures, for 
consumption by a white middle-class readership” (Schöberlein 2018: 454). In this connection, Kristin 
Boudreau has questioned the ethics of “Whitman’s voracious sympathy for the slave”, arguing that 
his effort to “enter into” the suffering of another is less about understanding another’s feelings and 
more a matter of ensuring “that one’s own are projected there” (Boudreau 2002: 84-5).  
Kristin Boudreau’s contention that Whitman’s sympathetic identification seeks to "replace 
difference with similarity" (Boudreau 2002: 12) is not a new criticism for it is memorably articulated 
in a series of essays by D. H. Lawrence, most trenchantly in his 1923 text in which he takes Whitman 
to task for his appeal to Christian sympathy: 
Whitman came along, and saw a slave, and said to himself: ‘That negro slave is a man like 
myself. We share the same identity. And he is bleeding with wounds. Oh, oh, is it not myself 
who am also bleeding with wounds?’ .. This was not sympathy. It was merging and self-
sacrifice. ‘Bear ye one another’s burdens’; ‘Love thy neighbour as thyself’: ‘Whatsoever ye 
do unto him, ye do unto me’. (Lawrence [1923] 1964: 175) 
4 
 
Lawrence claims that Whitman’s identification with all things and all people reduces their 
differences to the “awful pudding of One Identity” (Lawrence [1923] 1964: 166). Objecting to the 
declaration in Whitman’s closing line to section fifteen of Song of Myself - “And of these one and all I 
weave the song of myself”  - D. H. Lawrence famously retorts: ‘Do you? Well then, it just shows that 
you haven’t got any self. It’s a mush, not a woven thing” (Lawrence [1923] 1964: 165). Elsewhere, 
Lawrence insists that Whitman wants to become in his own person “the whole world” (Lawrence 
[1921] in Folsom 2014: 128) and that he is in flight from the truth that each soul is unique “and 
never other than itself” (Ibid):  “As soon as Walt knew a thing, he assumed a One Identity with it. If 
he knew that an Eskimo sat in a kyak, immediately there was Walt being little and yellow and greasy, 
sitting in a kyak” (Lawrence [1923] 1964: 166). 
As Karen Sánchez-Eppler points out, Whitman’s project of poetic embodiment in Song of Myself 
“which would permit his multiple migratory ‘I’ to inhabit the body of the other in all its difference” is 
in fundamental conflict with his project of poetic merger “which would encompass and negate all 
differences within his single swelling ‘I’” (Sánchez-Eppler 1993: 10). If the other is only illuminated 
through the “self-recognition” of the subject, what gets lost is an appreciation of embodied 
difference: the facticity of race, gender and disability that mark our different material histories. 
However, as the racist stereotyping in Lawrence’s own example reveals, insisting on the principle of 
discrete personhood is not in itself a sufficient condition for the recognition of embodied difference 
of the other. It is necessary, then, to ask if there is a way of attending to the materiality of 
experience which is bypasses these conceptual restrictions, a way, in short, of understanding 
sympathetic inclusion beyond the identity politics of representation. 
 
2. Sympathy as vital force 
 
In berating Whitman for not having a robust notion of “self”, for having allowed his own 
individual self to “leak out” in to the universe (Lawrence [1923] 1964: 165), D. H. Lawrence assumes 
the absolute primacy of the anthropic ideal to any discourse of sympathy.  However, we may have 
more to gain than we have to lose in rethinking the vocabulary of sympathy and inclusion beyond 
the principle of identity. As Jane Bennett has shown, in many places in his writings Whitman gently 
inflects the moral sentimentalism of his time toward “an older, more bodily definition of sympathy 
as a physics or network of affinities between natural bodies” (Bennett 2016: 610). She describes how 
elements of a classical “natural philosophy” notion of sympathy as a force that “draws bodies 
together” persisted in nineteenth century culture in a variety of guises including animal magnetism, 
mesmerism and neuromimesis (Bennett 2016: 608). Sympathy as material force can be interiorised 
as moral “sentiment” but it is also part of a larger, extra human field of forces that transcends the 
“self” and other concepts of isolated, discrete “things”.  In this regard, it is interesting to observe 
that the line in section twenty-two of Song of Myself, “ I am he attesting sympathy”, is succeeded by 
the parenthetical and rhetorical question: “(Shall I make my list of things in the house and skip the 
house that supports them?)” (sec. 22). The network of “support” for the self and its concerns is 
endlessly vast. Indeed, the inherence of human bodies in broader material networks and fluid 
systems might be regarded as the physiological condition of possibility for the more refined, 
psychological feelings of sympathy as such. Rather than conceiving of the “self” of Song of Myself as 
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an ever-swelling soul incorporating the universe, it is could be imagined more economically as a 
temporary constellation of forces coursing through the world, an ever-shifting site of 
communication, attraction and exchange.  
From its opening moments, the poem announces its elemental reach, a song of ‘nature without 
check with original energy’ (sec.1). Grass, tongue, atom, blood, soil, air, parents: the poem is a hymn 
of praise to the sheer vitality of things. Moreover, Song of Myself celebrates the uttering of living 
material forces, without distinction between human and non-human. Section eight of the poem 
resounds with the music of the street, with the talk of wayfarers just another hum in the background 
of vibrant life. 
The blab of the pave, tires of carts, sluff of boot-soles, talk /of the promenaders, The heavy 
omnibus, the driver with his interrogating thumb, the clank of the shod horses on the 
granite floor,/ The snow- sleighs, clinking, shouted jokes, pelts of snow-balls/ (section 8) 
The song of the “impassive stones that receive and return so many echoes” enunciates a world in 
which things have lives of their own (sec. 8). Bits of the world are subtly attuned to each other. The 
opera singer sustains her note and the glass shivers, vibrates and shatters. As Jane Bennett writes, 
Whitman models a world “where human beings are positioned not as potential masters of, but as 
co-participants with, other bodies” (Bennett, 2011: 136). Human action is never exclusively a matter 
of human agency but is intimately connected to and dependent upon a panoply of forces “from 
gravity to sunlight to bacteria to plastic to metals to plant matter, which act in concert and in conflict 
with us” (Bennett 2011: 135).  
The imbrication of self and world is vividly evoked in the “catalogue” that forms section 
thirty-one of Song of Myself: "I find I incorporate gneiss, coal, long-threaded moss, fruits, grains, 
esculent roots, / And am stucco'd with quadrupeds and birds all over" (sec. 31). The material forces 
that course through coal, moss and grains also animate the tongue and atoms of blood of the 
persona who is “form’d from this soil, this air” (sec. 1).  This radically non-anthropocentric vision has 
some obvious eco-political implications in an era of climate change where the challenge is to 
become much more alert to the interconnectivity of things and to relinquish the notion of the 
unique entitlement of the human animal. As Cristin Ellis comments: “Ecosystemic collapse is 
unmistakably structural: it has no center, its flashpoints of suffering cannot be remedied in isolation 
but require concerted and simultaneous action on multiple fronts” (Ellis 2016: 631). The humanist 
discourse of sympathy and inclusion is significantly reconfigured: sympathetic political action moves 
away from a kind of localism of individuals and addresses structures and systems more globally. 
Cristin Ellis acknowledges that rather than emphasizing my similarity to the other person, 
Whitman suggests a material connection to that other being (Ellis 2016: 631).  However, as she also 
acknowledges, this reimagining of the world in terms of networks and flows rather than types or 
classes of individuals “is unable to account for the politics of race, class, gender, sexuality, ability or 
species difference that have been so critical to the democratic expansions – and the rhetoric of 
sympathy – of the last two centuries” (Ellis 2016: 627).  Struggles for inclusion have typically 
challenged the universalist ideologies that ignore embodied difference but, despite Whitman’s close 
attention to the physicality of identity, on Ellis’s reading of Whitman, “embodied difference loses its 
significance” (Ellis 2016: 631).   
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The interdependencies of onto-affectivity [..] remove me from the fiction of my identity and 
restore me to the entangled materiality Whitman refers to as the ‘ocean of life,’ but by this 
restoration, my life becomes immune to the individualizing political syntax of identity and 
difference, sympathy and recognition. (Ellis 2016: 631) 
According to Ellis, in Whitman’s vision, individuals are “encroached upon, even subsumed” and “our 
entanglement collapses the distance across which ethical recognition passes” (Ellis 2016: 629).  If 
Ellis is right that there is no place for Whitman’s sympathies within the “individualizing political 
syntax of identity and difference” the political stakes are high.  The price of expanding sympathetic 
inclusion beyond the merely human is that we appear to lose the political vocabulary of community 
as such. 
It will not escape the reader that we appear to have come full circle. To assume that we 
either have a choice between a pluralist politics of sympathy predicated on the recognition of 
sameness and difference (I recognise a kinship with you although I will never know your pain) or a 
radical politics of interconnection and merger (which dissolves boundaries between self and other) is 
to restate the dialectic of the “one and all” that so preoccupies Lawrence. In both cases, difference is 
conceived as an object of representation in relation to some identity (the one and the all) and is 
never addressed in terms of its unique singularity. The assumption remains that Whitman’s account 
of vital, non-moral sympathies configures a world as one identity. However, the presumption that 
there is at base a sameness against which variation can be measured or deduced is ultimately an 
onto-theological prejudice – the legacy of a western rationalist inheritance. What gets missed is a 
thinking of difference as irreducible multiplicity, differences which are not grounded in anything else 
and which do not resolve into a pre-existing unity.  To trace the implications of this for our thinking 
about community, we now turn to Whitman’s catalogues. 
  
3. Catalogues 
 
In lines of disarming simplicity, section fifteen of Song of Myself unfolds as a living map of the 
American en masse:  
The pure contralto sings in the organ loft, 
       The carpenter dresses his plank, the tongue of his foreplane whistles its wild 
ascending lisp, 
       The married and unmarried children ride home to their Thanksgiving dinner, 
       The pilot seizes the king-pin, he heaves down with a strong arm, 
       The mate stands braced in the whale-boat, lance and harpoon are ready, 
       The duck-shooter walks by silent and cautious stretches, 
       The deacons are ordain’d with cross’d hands at the altar, 
       The spinning-girl retreats and advances to the hum of the big wheel, 
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       The farmer stops by the bar as he walks on a First-day loafe and looks at the oats 
and rye, 
        The lunatic is carried at last to the asylum a confirm’d case, 
        (He will never sleep any more as he did in the cot in his mother’s bed-room;) 
At first glance the catalogue of figures suggests a sentimental national symbolism at play yet after 
the depiction of traditional rural pursuits, of labour and recreation, the poem turns to the “lunatic 
carried at last to the asylum a confirm’d case,/ (He will never sleep any more as he did in the cot in 
his mother’s bed-room;)”. From here, the catalogue rolls on, proliferating images of the prosaic and 
the tragic, minor moments of individual lives, strikingly juxtaposed. Although the section closes with 
the line “And of these one and all I weave the song of myself” the migrant “I” is held in abeyance 
throughout. At no point is it obvious how these vast lists of people and activities are to be read. 
Arguably, this is because here we are presented with the proliferation of difference without any 
overarching principle of identity. As Stefan Schöberlein notes: 
Rarely allowing for moments of repose, these long lists create an almost rhythmic image of 
the United States through its sentimental promises and disappointments. Without the 
narrative anchor of having clear-cut causes and solutions already provided by a coherent, 
moralistic storyline for these moments of suffering, this barrage of stock figures is deeply 
unsettling. If it asks readers to identify with the nation, it certainly does not “blind” those 
who take up the book to what this entails. If readers want “deacons . . . ordained with 
crossed hands at the altar,” they will also have to face “the quadroon girl . . . sold at the 
stand.” (Schöberlein 2018:  465) 
With the catalogue form, Whitman finds a way for expressing a new movement of thought, 
one which is not easily assimilated to our prevailing habits. According to William Spengemann, 
Whitman used poetry as a vehicle for thinking, “to arrive somewhere as yet unreached” 
(Spengemann 2010: xiii). Whereas established poetic conventions are well-suited to express widely 
entertained feeling, a new lexicon is required to articulate unusual and perhaps hitherto 
unknowable affects: “To assert membership in an existing community of feeling, the poet employs a 
familiar form and style. To think for themselves, however, poets must devise languages of their 
own”(ibid.). The catalogue is a new language, one which prompts interestingly mixed opinions on 
how it is to be read.  Schöberlein makes the point that “in these catalogues, there is rarely any time 
to reflect or pronounce judgment—life just marches on, regardless: the ‘machinist rolls up his 
sleeves. . . . the policeman travels his beat. . . . the gate-keeper marks who pass’ (Schöberlein 2018: 
465). Kenneth Burke speaks of skimming the catalogues “as when running the eye down the column 
of a telephone directory”(Burke 1955: 97) whereas John Mason says that the reader skims in the 
hope of finding connectives to yoke together the “onrush of apparently disconnected 
images”(Mason 1973: 45). By contrast, Jane Bennett sees that catalogues in terms of a slowing of 
the tempo. She suggests that “Whitman did not believe that sympathy would be sufficient to 
address the inequalities and injustices of his day, but there is nonetheless, he thought, real political 
work it could do.” (Bennett 2016: 615). In this context she identifies his technique of “doting” which 
she defines as “paying slow attention to ordinary objects, things, shapes, words, bodies” (Ibid.). She 
proposes that “Whitman’s use of catalogues is itself a practice of doting upon an outside: the lists 
8 
 
with their creative juxtapositions of items prime the reader’s receptivity to the startlingly vital 
presence of everything” (Ibid). 
Despite differences of view about speeds and slownesses, Whitman’s readers recognise that 
the apparently dissociated images achieve a powerful effect as part of a list. According to Belknap,  
For Whitman the list offered opportunities to experiment with form, provided platforms on 
which to display his broad sympathy with his fellow Americans, and facilitated the 
elaboration of different ways of conceiving the relation of the individual to the surrounding 
world. (Belknap 2004: 119) 
As a number of critics have noted, Whitman’s metricality eschews hypotactic grammarii in favour of 
structures that use coordinating rather than subordinating conjunctions. Belknap recognises that 
Section fifteen of Song of Myself presents the “intriguing proximate juxtaposition of a prostitute with 
the president” and raises the question as to whether the connection here is “phonetic,” or a 
“political” comment on “the extremes” of American lives: “Does the speaker intend to indicate 
parity or disparity, the equality of citizens or the inequality across the span of society?” (Belknap 
2004: 89). At the level of form there is something levelling and “democratic” about the refusal of 
subordination. Raising the question, “Is there a difference in sympathy corresponding to the 
difference in verbal exactitude?”, Belknap reflects on variations within the Whitman’s catalogue 
form and goes on to speculate that “certain representations of life require greater or lesser 
definition” (Belknap 2004: 90).  
Arguably, this turn towards questions of representation is inherently limited for it is not 
obvious why some “representations of life” should require more elaboration than others or why 
some figures should be more deserving of sympathy. To claim as much would be to default to the 
stock figures of the sentimentalist genre which are less obviously legible within the catalogue form. 
A kindred attempt at content analysis is advanced by Brian Folker who deems the “unlikely pairings” 
- which are typical of the catalogue as a whole - an illustration of “the all inclusiveness of both the 
poet’s vision and the one life”: “Does everything in the list have the same moral status?” (Folker 
2011: 5). Folker suggests that the “forward momentum” of the catalogue “has us moving so quickly” 
that one cannot pose this question (Ibid.). However, he suggests that things change when we 
encounter the lines detailing the prostitute:  
The prostitute draggles her shawl, her bonnet bobs on her/ tipsy and pimpled neck,/ The 
crowd laugh at her blackguard oaths, the men jeer and/ wink to each other,/ (Miserable! I 
do not laugh at your oaths nor jeer you,) 
In the original 1855 version of Song of Myself the rebuke to the mob is the only parenthetical aside  
in the entire poem. According to Folker, this parenthesis imposes a break in the poetic flow that 
carries with it a risk for when we “pause to consider the poet’s sympathy for the prostitute” our faith 
in “the one life” is undermined:  
We see that Whitman has broken his visionary progress in order to extend his sympathy to a 
lone individual. But to extend his sympathy to the prostitute, must Whitman withdraw it 
from the crowd that torments her? Does such withdrawal of sympathy imply a moral 
condemnation of the mob? (Folker 2011: 5) 
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It is problematic that Folker should insist on trying to shoehorn a preconceived notion of “the one 
life” into his reading here since his questions themselves indicate how vapid it would be if the 
“inclusive” were simply synonymous with the “indiscriminate”. Arguably, it is the form rather than 
the “content” of the moment that matters more here. As Folker highlights, the poem’s one and only 
parenthesis is a visual event for someone reading the poem rather than listening to it being read 
(Folker 2011: 6) (a potential “disruption” to those readers inclined to “skim”). It is also worth adding 
that the extra lines given to the micro-narrative of the prostitute make it one of the most 
memorable in the catalogue for here we hear a resistant voice, one who in answering back, causing 
the rhythm to stagger. 
 As with the prostitute, the vignette of the lunatic is a moment of deviation within the flow of 
the poem, another pause for thought. This point is echoed by Paul Jaussen who acknowledges that 
any notion of idealised representation cease to apply when one encounters the lines detailing the 
lunatic:  
The parenthetical aside tears the lunatic from the category of ‘all madmen,’ and transforms 
the term into a moment of particularity: this lunatic. For not all lunatics sleep in cots in their 
mother’s bedroom, and that detail, suggesting a complex family drama, refines the 
paratactic focus, shifting the poem from the representative to the deictic, creating a pointing 
gesture, not an idealization. (Jaussen 2017: 630) 
The fate of the lunatic is not representative of anything: his case is singular and unique. Here we see 
further variation within the catalogue, not simply in lineation but in verb tense and active and 
passive voice. The lunatic does not act, he is carried out to the asylum, which as Maire Mullins 
comments, suggests coercion or, at the very least, lack of agency (Mullins 2018: 219). The difference, 
though, is not his passivity but the nature of the aside. We are told that “he will never sleep any 
more as he did in the cot in his mother’s bedroom”. The parenthetical amplification strikes a jarring 
note in the rhythm of the poem by deploying a different tense and verb form. Amid all the parallel 
present participles - reinforcing the busyness of farmers and singers and carpenters - this is a break 
in time. The future will not resemble the past. Something has ended. His story is all the more 
affecting for being buttressed by the tales of the well-occupied and industrious. We do not know 
what he does or will do, only what has ceased. 
 With the catalogue, Whitman discovers a means of reconciling the vital materiality of lived 
experience with the unique particularity of difference. In “Starting from Paumanok,” Whitman’s 
persona asserts that he will not make poems with reference to parts but with reference to 
“ensemble”. As Paul Jaussen has remarked, “The ensemble, for Whitman, acknowledges each part as 
an individual, in which each no part can be substituted by or for another” (Jaussen 2017: 52). The 
refusal of parts here is understood as a refusal of representative emblems, “metonymic 
replacements by which one element stands in for everything else” (Ibid.). In contrast to the dialectic 
of identity and difference, the “other” is never one with whom I might exchange places. Section 
fifteen of Song of Myself celebrates the uniqueness implicit in particularity as such, not particularity 
as an aspect of a pre-existing whole. Each concrete moment is announced in its specificity. At the 
level of ideas, the poem explores the irreducible alterity of the other, not my self-recognition in 
otherness or the inclusion of the many in the “one life”.  
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This is still more to be said about how the catalogue functions as a new “community of feeling”. 
When we move away from questioning what the poem represents and attend to how these shifts in 
poetic gear are materially experienced, Whitman’s notion of non-moral, non-personal sympathy has 
more relevance than commentators have previously supposed. As Robert Creeley has noted, “there 
is a great deal of syntactic ‘rhyming’ in Whitman’s poetry, insistently parallel syntactic structures 
which themselves make a strong web of coherence” (Creeley 2014: 290-291). This is complemented 
by “parallelism in the nature of what is being thought and/ or felt as emotion” which can serve to 
“increase the experience of coherence in the statement the poem is working to accomplish” (Ibid.). 
If we attempt to access this idea in terms of rhythm, it could be said that what we feel as we listen to 
section fifteen of Song of Myself is the tempo of daily life, its gentle regularities, its subtle variations. 
The lineation is malleable but the iteration of the definite article imposes a regularity that is 
physiologically compelling. When this falters in the lines detailing the lunatic or the prostitute, the 
listener experiences a break in the flow which is beyond conscious reach. Whitman’s poem does not 
simply make us “see” the confluence of humans in vast, non-human networks, it impels us to feel a 
sympathy with extra-human flows.  
Just as the “tires of carts” and “sluff of boot-soles” resonate with the “impassive stones that 
receive and return so many echoes” (sec. 8), deep physiological rhythms resonate with the syntax of 
Whitman’s words. This is matter sympathising with matter, the poem itself a product of “my 
respiration and inspiration, the beating of my heart, the passing of blood and/ air through my lungs” 
(sec. 2). This is a challenge to the concept of political community traditionally conceived for it 
includes the human and non-human, sensations and sensibilities. As Cristin Ellis writes “the 
argument for a radically inclusive political community has as much to do with recognizing the 
objecthood of humans as it does with sensing the sympathetic subjecthood or humanity of 
nonhumans” (Ellis 2016: 631).  
The man who has been confirmed as a ‘lunatic’ and carried to the asylum is not an obvious 
member of a community. Nor is the quadroon girl sold at the auction stand, nor the opium eater, 
nor the prostitute who is jeered and laughed at by the crowd. Nor, perhaps, the president. Each 
figure exists in his or her particularity. There is no collective identity in this poem. Nor is there pity 
for those who are destitute. We do not know about the suffering of the lunatic or the prostitute or 
indeed any of the figures called into being by Whitman’s song. In the catalogue in section fifteen, 
Whitman creates a “community of those who have nothing in common”.iii The lunatic’s plight 
disrupts the present tense of work and industry, the prostitute’s voice disturbs the flow of third 
person naming. These social outcasts capture our attention because we feel a break in the rhythm of 
things. It is this feeling of rupture in our “experience of coherence” that Whitman’s poem calls into 
being. It is not fellow feeling for a suffering other but the pull of vibrant life, coursing within and 
outside individual bodies.  
Let us return to Whitman’s assertion “And of these one and all I weave the song of myself’ 
(sec. 15). Notably, this is prefaced by the more equivocal: “And such as it is to be of these more or 
less I am”, which was Whitman’s chosen ending for section fifteen of Song of Myself until the 
additional line was added in the 1881-2 edition. Whitman’s song (and Whitman’s self) are not the 
arithmetical total of all the things he describes in his poetry. These are not fixed elements or atoms 
of individuality adding up to a “community”. Community, as Whitman helps us to see it, is a web of 
incommensurable otherness. It does not need a shared fantasy of national identity to sustain it. 
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Whitman’s assertion is that he is “of” these things and that “of” is doubly qualified by the “more” 
and the “less”. As in the weave of even the simplest music, whether a note is high or low or a rhythm 
slow or fast depends upon its relationship to other notes and rhythms which are themselves unfixed. 
Whitman’s song and self are highly mobile, emerging from variable differentials, from a community 
of those who have nothing in common. 
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